Centralizers, Casing, Caps & Relief Wells
CentralizersThe cracks on the ocean floor are the direct result of the single string casing used by BP and the failure to apply proper cementing bond logs in addition to only using 6 centralizers instead of the recommended 21.
www.huliq.com/9990/ocean-floor-gulf-mexico-verge-collapsingCentralizers. When the final string of casing was installed, one key challenge was making sure the casing ran down the center of the well bore. As the American Petroleum Institute's recommended practices explain, if the casing is not centered, "it is difficult, if not impossible, to displace mud effectively from the narrow side of the annulus," resulting in a failed cement job. Halliburton, the contractor hired by BP to cement the well, warned BP that the well could have a "SEVERE gas flow problem" if BP lowered the final string of casing with only six centralizers instead of the 21 recommended by Halliburton. BP rejected Halliburton's advice to use additional centralizers. In an e-mail on April 16, a BP official involved in the decision explained: "it will take 10 hours to install them . ... I do not like this." Later that day, another official recognized the risks of proceeding with insufficient centralizers but commented: "who cares, it's done, end of story, will probably be fine."
www.theoildrum.com/node/6604____________________________
CasingBP chose riskier, cheaper casing for well: report
WASHINGTON | Thu May 27, 2010 12:16am EDT
(Reuters) - BP Plc installed a type of cement casing on its now-ruptured undersea well that it knew ran the risk of leaking gases in order to save money, The New York Times reported on Wednesday, citing a BP document it received from a congressional investigator...
The newspaper said the company decided to use the casing several days before the explosion. It was installed by the contractor Halliburton.
BP said the riskier single barrier option made the best economic case, according to the newspaper.
On Wednesday, federal investigators said the cementing on the well must have failed at some point. Halliburton has defended its work, saying that all of its cementing procedures were dictated by BP.
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64Q0SG20100527______________________________
CapsUpdated at 10 p.m. ET on July 12
Unlike the previous cap, a simple structure that sat on top of the cut-off riser and funneled oil to a surface ship, the new cap is a monstrous and complex 18-foot-tall device that weighs upwards of 75 tons. Called a “three-ram stack,” the new cap resembles a mini–blowout preventer, with hydraulic valves that should be strong enough to hold back the oil flow entirely.
www.newsweekparentsguide.com/2010/07/12/ending-the-spill-finally.html____________________________________
Relief WellsSpill relief well draws scrutiny, fears
Experts say effort faces similar risks that caused original well to blow out
updated 6/13/2010 6:06:51 PM ET
And the plan ultimately approved by the government offers virtually no details outlining the relief well effort or what dangers might lurk in the depths as the company drills 18,000 feet below the surface — the equivalent of 16 Eiffel Towers. Experts say the relief effort could be exposed to the same risks that caused the original well to blow out in catastrophic fashion, while potentially creating a worse spill if engineers were to accidentally damage the existing well or tear a hole in the undersea oil reservoir.
The gaps in the relief well process mirror other regulatory issues and oversights that have been exposed since the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded on April 20, killed 11 workers and sent tens of millions of gallons of oil gushing into the Gulf. The Associated Press earlier found that BP's voluminous spill plans for the Gulf and rig were riddled with omissions and glaring errors, leading to criticism that the company has essentially been making things up as it goes. Among the omissions were a lack of a clear plan for a relief well.
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37674027/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/