BP Cites Crucial 'Mistake''Very Large Abnormality'
May 26, 2010 5:51:18 GMT -8
Post by moabiter on May 26, 2010 5:51:18 GMT -8
BP Cites Crucial 'Mistake'
'Very Large Abnormality' in the Well Wasn't Heeded Hours Before Fatal Explosion
STEPHEN POWER, BUSINESS, MAY 25, 2010
Oil giant BP PLC told congressional investigators that a decision to continue work on an oil well in the Gulf of Mexico after a test warned that something was wrong may have been a "fundamental mistake," according to a memo released by two lawmakers Tuesday.
The document describes a wide array of mistakes in the fateful final hours aboard the Deepwater Horizon—but the main revelation is that BP now says there was a clear warning sign of a "very large abnormality" in the well, but work proceeded anyway.
The rig exploded about two hours later...
According to the memo, BP identified several other mistakes aboard the rig, including possible contamination of the cement meant to seal off the well from volatile natural gas and the apparent failure to monitor the well closely for signs that gas was leaking in, the congressmen wrote in their post-meeting memo. An immense column of natural gas, erupting from the oil well, fueled the fireball that destroyed the rig.
A BP spokesman declined to comment on the memo's specific statements. He said the company had identified "what we believe to be a series of underlying failures" that caused the accident.
Although the memo identifies some of the problems that led to these mistakes, it doesn't identify who made the key decisions. Most of the work aboard the rig was performed by employees of Transocean Ltd., the rig's owner and operator, and other contractors, but BP had managers aboard the rig to supervise the work at the time of the accident.
The memo sheds new light on a key test performed hours before the explosion that has been a focus of congressional investigations. BP previously told investigators that a "negative pressure" test, which checks for leaks in the well, was inconclusive at best and "not satisfactory" at worst.
But in the meeting Tuesday, BP went further, saying the results were an "indicator of a very large abnormality" but that workers—unnamed in the memo—decided by 7:55 p.m. that the test was successful after all. That may have been a "fundamental mistake," BP's investigator said in the meeting, according to the memo. Reps. Henry Waxman (D., Calif.) and Bart Stupak (D., Mich.) wrote the memo, which was made public Tuesday.
After that, workers began to remove the heavy drilling fluid, called "mud" in the industry, that provides pressure to prevent any gas that seeps into the well from rising to the surface.
The memo also describes a breakdown in communication aboard the rig in the hours leading up to the explosion that made it tough for workers to monitor how much mud was coming out of the well—a key measure of whether gas is leaking in, according to the memo.
BP identified "several concerns" related to the cementing process used on the well, the memo indicated. The cement work that was supposed to hold back gas "failed," the memo said, allowing gas into the well.
Halliburton, Co., the cementing contractor on the rig, said it followed BP's instructions. "As a contractor, Halliburton made recommendations regarding the contract services provided," said Halliburton spokeswoman Cathy Mann. "However, ultimately, the responsibility for what operations to conduct lies with the well owner, and Halliburton is obligated to act at the direction of the well owner." ...
ARTICLE: online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575265701607603066.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories
'Very Large Abnormality' in the Well Wasn't Heeded Hours Before Fatal Explosion
STEPHEN POWER, BUSINESS, MAY 25, 2010
Oil giant BP PLC told congressional investigators that a decision to continue work on an oil well in the Gulf of Mexico after a test warned that something was wrong may have been a "fundamental mistake," according to a memo released by two lawmakers Tuesday.
The document describes a wide array of mistakes in the fateful final hours aboard the Deepwater Horizon—but the main revelation is that BP now says there was a clear warning sign of a "very large abnormality" in the well, but work proceeded anyway.
The rig exploded about two hours later...
According to the memo, BP identified several other mistakes aboard the rig, including possible contamination of the cement meant to seal off the well from volatile natural gas and the apparent failure to monitor the well closely for signs that gas was leaking in, the congressmen wrote in their post-meeting memo. An immense column of natural gas, erupting from the oil well, fueled the fireball that destroyed the rig.
A BP spokesman declined to comment on the memo's specific statements. He said the company had identified "what we believe to be a series of underlying failures" that caused the accident.
Although the memo identifies some of the problems that led to these mistakes, it doesn't identify who made the key decisions. Most of the work aboard the rig was performed by employees of Transocean Ltd., the rig's owner and operator, and other contractors, but BP had managers aboard the rig to supervise the work at the time of the accident.
The memo sheds new light on a key test performed hours before the explosion that has been a focus of congressional investigations. BP previously told investigators that a "negative pressure" test, which checks for leaks in the well, was inconclusive at best and "not satisfactory" at worst.
But in the meeting Tuesday, BP went further, saying the results were an "indicator of a very large abnormality" but that workers—unnamed in the memo—decided by 7:55 p.m. that the test was successful after all. That may have been a "fundamental mistake," BP's investigator said in the meeting, according to the memo. Reps. Henry Waxman (D., Calif.) and Bart Stupak (D., Mich.) wrote the memo, which was made public Tuesday.
After that, workers began to remove the heavy drilling fluid, called "mud" in the industry, that provides pressure to prevent any gas that seeps into the well from rising to the surface.
The memo also describes a breakdown in communication aboard the rig in the hours leading up to the explosion that made it tough for workers to monitor how much mud was coming out of the well—a key measure of whether gas is leaking in, according to the memo.
BP identified "several concerns" related to the cementing process used on the well, the memo indicated. The cement work that was supposed to hold back gas "failed," the memo said, allowing gas into the well.
Halliburton, Co., the cementing contractor on the rig, said it followed BP's instructions. "As a contractor, Halliburton made recommendations regarding the contract services provided," said Halliburton spokeswoman Cathy Mann. "However, ultimately, the responsibility for what operations to conduct lies with the well owner, and Halliburton is obligated to act at the direction of the well owner." ...
ARTICLE: online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575265701607603066.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories